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I.  Dominant  Characteristics of  Agriculture
Three characteristics  dominate the agricultural scene in the 1950's.
They  are:  widespread  technological  advance,  a  competitive  market
organization,  and  the inelastic  demand  for food.
A.  WIDESPREAD  TECHNOLOGICAL  ADVANCE.  This  is  a  part  of  the
American  creed;  Americans  value  it  highly  in  all  sectors  of the
economy.  Since  it  is  generously  financed  in  agriculture,  we  can
expect  a continuous  outpouring  of  new  technologies.  In  this  dy-
namic situation  farmers  do not seek  the minimum  point on  some
long-run  static  planning  curve;  year  after  year  they  move  from
one  long-run  planning  curve  to  the next,  but  always  to  a  lower
curve.  The only real question is: At what rate is  this technological
advance  going to occur; hence,  at what rate  is  the aggregate  sup-
ply function  going to shift  to the right? Technological  advance  is
the  key  variable  in  agricultural  production.
B.  A COMPETITIVE  MARKET  ORGANIZATION.  This  is  the engine  of the
farm  economic  system;  a  competitive  market  organization  pro-
vides  the  incentive  for  widespread  technological  advance.  Each
farmer  reasons  that he  cannot influence  prices,  but  he  can  lower
his  costs  by  adopting  new  techniques,  new  practices.  But  when
all farmers  do  this,  aggregate  output expands  and  since  1951  it
has  expanded  persistently  in the face  of falling  prices.  The  com-
petitive  market  organization  in  agriculture  provides  the  motive
power  for  a  continuously  expanding  aggregate  output.
C.  THE  INELASTIC  DEMAND  FOR  FOOD.  Expanding  supplies  would
create  no  problem  if  the  price  and  income  elasticities  for  food
were greater  than  1.0.  But they are not; they  are exceedingly  low
-approaching  .2  in each  case.  Thus  a little  surplus  in  aggregate
supplies  causes  the farm  price  level  to fall disastrously.  Continu-
ously  expanding  supplies,  growing  out  of widespread  technologi-
cal advance,  press  against the inelastic demand for food and drive
farm  prices  to  low  levels  and  hold  them  there.
D.  IN SUMMARY,  three characteristics  of agriculture-widespread  tech-
nological  advance,  a  competitive  market  organization,  and  the
inelastic  demand  for food-related  as  they  are,  give  rise  to  con-
tinual  low  prices  and  income  in  peacetime-making  agriculture
a  chronically  sick  industry.
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A.  LABOR  MOBILITY.  This  is the current fad. Economists  are all going
to  solve  the farm  problem  these  days  by  moving  workers  out  of
agriculture.  These economists seem to forget that people have been
moving  out of agriculture at a rapid rate since  1940.  Some  14 per-
cent of the farm  labor force  moved out of  agriculture  in the first
six years of the 1950's.  We must have this out-migration; it is basic
to,  necessary  to,  general  economic  growth  and  it  is  a  necessary
condition  to  solving  the  continuing  peacetime  price  and  income
problem  in agriculture,  but it is not a sufficient  condition.  We are
unlikely  to  move  enough  people  out  of  agriculture  by  1965  to
bring supply  into balance with demand  again.  This might require
the  movement  of 30  to 40 percent  of the existing  labor force  out
of commercial agriculture.  And such a rate of out-migration  would
create  new and  difficult social  problems  in rural  communities.
B.  VERTICAL  INTEGRATION.  This  will not stop  the flood tide of  food
supplies  any more  than laying  pipes  vertically  in  a flooding river
would  serve  to dam that river.  More  vertical  integration will  shift
somewhat  the bargaining  power  of buyers  and  sellers  in  agricul-
tural commodity markets  (probably  away from farmer-producers),
but  it has  no  capacity  to  deal with the  basic  problem  of  general
overproduction.
C.  THE  MANY  OTHER  POPULAR  SOLUTIONS  that might be mentioned
(e.g.,  flexible  price supports,  more efficient  marketing,  fixed  price
supports)  all run squarely into the hard facts of too much produc-
tion this year and too much in the foreseeable future arising out of:
1.  Widespread  technological  advance.
2.  A competitive  market  organization.
3.  The inelastic  demand for  food.
III.  Effective  Production and Marketing  Controls Necessary
If farmers want good and  stable incomes,  and if the rest of society
will not underwrite  the continuing costs  of price  and income  support,
then farmers  must accept  effective  production  and marketing  controls
-they  have  no  other  alternative.  They  must  accept  supply  control
devices  that enable  the many  producers  in agriculture  to  adjust  sup-
plies to demand,  commodity  by commodity,  year after year.
A.  Since  1951  the urban  sector  of  society has  underwritten  the  cost
of price  and  income  support  in  agriculture-transferring  some  3
to  5  billion  dollars  of  income  into  agriculture  in  1957.  But will
society continue  to do this? It seems highly doubtful.  The support
for Secretary  Benson's  policy  of  lowering  the  level  of  price  and
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political  aisle.  Urban people  are  tired  of  the farm  problem;  they
want  to be rid of it  and  the painful  income  transfers.
So long  as  urban  people  are  willing  to bear  the cost  of  price
and income  support in agriculture almost anything will work; even
the  untidy  1957  farm  program  provides  a  great  deal  of  income
support for  farmers.  But  when the urban  sector  no longer  is will-
ing to pick  up the check,  then farm  people must make  a decision.
They must decide  whether  they want  good  and stable  incomes  or
complete  freedom  to plant  and reap  as they  please.  They  cannot
have  both  in a  free,  unsupported  market.  They  cannot  have  the
best of these  two possible worlds  unless the rest  of society  is  will-
ing to underwrite  the cost.
B.  I am well  aware that farmers  generally consider controls  over  sup-
ply to be  a nuisance,  and  I am not sure  that they will ever  accept
effective  controls.  Certainly they will not if they value freedom  of
decision  making  as  highly  as  Mr.  Benson  thinks  they  do.  But  if
they  value good  and stable  incomes  more  than  they  do  complete
freedom  in farm  decision  making  (as I  think  they  do),  and  they
realize  what  a  free  market  really  means  to  them  (in  the  middle
1950's  with a return to the free market,  and  assuming  away  gov-
ernment-owned  stocks,  the  farm  price  level  might  be  30  to  40
percent  lower than  it is  and  net incomes  25  percent  lower),  then
they may  be very  happy to  accept  effective  controls  over supply.
It  is  not  unrealistic  to  conclude  that  when  farmers  become
convinced  that good and  stable incomes  are absolutely  dependent
upon effective supply control, they will approve of and accept those
controls-witness  the actions of the tobacco growers, fluid milk pro-
ducers,  and sugar producers.  Farmers  generally  do not realize the
seriousness  of  their  situation;  they  live  by  a myth-a  myth  of  a
"sound,"  healthy  agriculture  that  is  only  a little  out  of  balance.
They live by this myth because  they have been told repeatedly  by
politicians  and  their  leaders  that agriculture  is  basically  "sound"
-that with  a little "fixing"  this "emergency"  will pass  and  all will
be  well.  But  the  hard  facts  are  that the  core  of  agriculture-the
feed,  grain,  livestock  economy-is  sick  and  no  slight-of-hand  is
going  to make  it well.
C.  To repeat then-if farmers really want and  are determined to have
good and  stable prices  and  incomes  as  a regular  thing,  they must
accept  effective  production  and  marketing  controls  as  a  regular
thing.
1. They must restrain  the monster of too much production  arising
out of widespread  technological  advance!
872.  They can  do  this  only  by  regulating  themselves  through  group
action.
IV.  The Public Utility  Approach
Basic  to  a supply  control  approach  acceptable  to  producers  and
consumers alike is the idea that agriculture  be viewed  as a public utility
-a  giant utility composed of many, many small producing  units  acting
in  concert  with  the  aid  and  consent  of  government  to  produce  the
quantities  of  food  and  fiber required by  consumers,  at  a  fair  return
to the  producers  involved.
In  this  view,  government  establishes  the  institutional  machinery
for,  and  grants  the  power  to,  agriculture  to enable  the  many,  many
producers  involved  to  produce  those  quantities  of  farm  products  de-
manded  by  consumers  at  a  fair  price.  For  this  grant  of  monopoly
power,  government  reserves  to  itself,  as  in  the  case  of  any  enfran-
chised  public utility  (e.g.,  the railroads, telephone  companies,  and gas
and electric companies),  the right to determine and fix rates and prices,
hence  the  right to determine  fair returns  to the producers  involved.
Where competition  has led to ruinously  low prices  and returns,  or
poor  service,  or injury  to  certain  persons  or  groups,  government  has
historically  intervened  to regularize  that  competition,  to  equalize  the
bargaining power among  contending  parties  and  to redress  inequities.
Government was  performing  in this  role when  it brought  the railroads
under  the  control  of  the Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  when  it
gave  unions  the  right  to bargain  collectively,  and  as  it  has  tried  to
provide  commercial  agriculture  with  price  and  income  support.
Where  the continuous  and  uninterrupted  provision  of  a  product,
or service,  was  deemed  essential  to  the well-being  of  the  community,
government has traditionally  granted certain  firms  the monopoly  right
to supply  the needs  of consumers  with  that product,  or service,  under
the  supervision  of  government  with  respect  to  such  things  as  rates,
safety,  quality,  and  so on  (i.e.,  created public utilities).
Now  it  is proposed  here  that  the  government  adopt  this  general
policy  with  respect  to  agriculture  to  insure  producers  of  reasonably
good  and stable  prices  and  incomes  in  the  first  instance,  and  perhaps
in  some  later  period,  when  circumstances  require  it,  to  insure  con-
sumers  of an adequate  food  supply  at  reasonable  prices.
The  main  outlines  of  this  public  utility  approach  to  agriculture
were sketched by the speaker at a joint meeting of the American  Farm
Economic  Association  and  the  American  Economic  Association  in
December  1956.  They are:'
I See  the  article,  "An  Appraisal  of  Recent  Changes  in  Agricultural  Programs  in
the United States,"  Journal  of Farm Economics, May  1957.
88A.  Congress  would  be responsible  for  determining  and  setting  forth
fair,  or parity,  prices  for  agriculture,  as  it  does  now.  But  in this
scheme  of  things  the role  of parity  prices has  changed.  No longer
would  parity prices serve as pegs  on which  to support farm market
prices;  rather they would serve  as  guides in the setting of national
sales  quotas.  Thus,  in the determination  of parity  prices  for  agri-
culture, Congress  would in fact be  determining fair prices for both
consumers  and  producers,  and  the  needs  and  interests  of  both
groups would have to be considered.
B.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture would set national sales quotas
for  each  principal  agricultural  commodity  in  amounts  which  the
USDA had estimated would clear the market at the predetermined
fair,  or parity,  prices.  In  practice  this  might  mean  the  establish-
ment of national quotas on each principal farm commodity destined
for human  consumption  moving  into the marketing  channel  (say
15  to  25  commodities).  These  national  sales  quotas  would,  of
course,  vary from year  to year  as demand conditions  changed,  or
as  Congress  redefined  parity  prices.  To  avoid,  or  to  minimize,
the difficult  problem  of integrating  production  controls  vertically,
national  sales  quotas  would  not  be  established  for  commodities
typically  consumed  on farms,  sold  among farms,  or sold to farms
(e.g.,  feed  grains,  feeder  cattle,  baby  chicks).
C.  Each farmer at the inception  of the program would receive  a mar-
ket share,  his  pro rata share, of the national  sales quota  for  each
commodity,  based probably on his historical record of production.
The  farmer's  share  might  be  received  in  small  denominational
units, to which, for purposes of exposition, we give the name "mar-
keting certificates."  Once  the  program  was  in operation  a farmer
could not legally market  any  commodity  having  a national  quota
except insofar as he had marketing certificates  to cover  the quanti-
ties  involved.  The number  of marketing  certificates  would  not be
increased,  or  decreased,  from  year  to  year  with  changes  in  the
national  sales  quota  for  a  particular  commodity.  Rather,  each
farmer  could market  an announced  percentage  of the  face  value
of  each  of  his  certificates-a  percentage  in  accordance  with  the
national sales quota for the year. By this device the awkward prob-
lem  of  issuing  and  confiscating  marketing  certificates  would  be
avoided for the bulk of agricultural  production.
D.  Each marketing certificate would be negotiable. Each farmer would
be free  to buy or sell marketing  certificates  as  he  saw  fit.  By this
device  freedom  of  entry  and  exit would  be maintained  within  a
controlled  agriculture.  By  this device  the individual farm  operator
would be free to expand production, or contract it, in light of local
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fair price.  The value of operating  in a stabilized  agriculture where
product  prices  and  returns  were  relatively  certain  and  relatively
good, and where long-range production  plans could be formulated
with  reasonable  assurance  of  materializing  would,  of  course,  get
capitalized  into  these  marketing  certificates.  The  price  of  these
certificates would become the cost of doing business in a stabilized
agriculture.
E.  Many other programs  could,  and possibly  should, be linked to the
above skeletonized  proposal. To illustrate, the United States might
for  a  variety  of  reasons  (e.g.,  human  welfare,  international  col-
lective  security)  wish  to subsidize  food  exports  to needy  nations
to help finance their long-term programs of economic development.
Thus, the national  sales quota for any one year would equal domes-
tic demand,  plus  any commercial  exports  plus  subsidized exports.
If  the  decision  were  made  to  include  establishment  and  mainte-
nance of a strategic food reserve, the requirements of such a reserve
would  need to be  taken into account  each  year in the determina-
tion of national sales  quotas.
In  another  direction,  it  might  prove  beneficial  to  both  pro-
ducers  and  consumers  for the U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture  to
operate  a purchase,  storage,  and  disposal  program  in connection
with the general control program. In years of below-average  yields
government held stocks would be put on the market to hold prices
at the defined  parity prices,  and  in years  of  above-average  yields
marketing  quotas  would be  increased  by  a few percentage  points
and the  excess  supply would  be purchased  and placed  in storage.
This  type  of  bona  fide  storage  program  would  serve  to  stabilize
marketable  supplies,  and ease the production problems  of farmers
arising  out  of weather  uncertainty.
V.  Criticisms of Public  Utilities Approach
Numerous  criticisms  have  and can be leveled  at this supply  con-
trol approach.  The most common  are:  (1)  the capitalization  of mon-
opoly  gains into land values  argument  and  (2)  the loss  of  efficiency
argument.
A.  It is  commonly argued that the monopoly  gains resulting from the
successful control of supplies  would be capitalized into land values;
hence  the question  is  asked:  Of what  possible  benefit  could  such
controls  be  to  farmers?  The  question  might  be  turned  around:
When have farmers ever experienced  increased returns when those
increased  returns  were  not  capitalized  into  higher  land  values?
Increased  net  farm  incomes,  whether  they  arise  out  of  wartime
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capitalized  into  land  values.  Thus,  the  final  question  might  be
asked:  Are we  never  to help,  or to  expect,  farm  incomes  to  rise
because  such  income  increases  are capitalized  into land?
This speaker does not question the proposition that benefits  to
farmers  resulting from  effective  supply control  (i.e.,  rising  net in-
comes  first, and more stable incomes second)  would be capitalized
into  land  values,  and in  the longer run  average  costs  per unit  of
output would equal  average revenue.  But this  is not bad; it is  sim-
ply  a restatement  of the old  adage  that "you  don't get something
for  nothing  in this world."  In  this longer  run situation,  however,
farmers  would benefit  from supply  control  in two  ways:
1. Production  planning would be  facilitated  as  year-to-year  com-
modity price  variations  were  leveled  out.
2. Farmers would be free of that gnawing fear that they might lose
their farm,  and  see  their  other  assets  melt  away,  under  one  of
those wide and periodic down swings in the farm price level.
In  summary,  with  effective  supply  control,  farmers  would  be
operating  in a stabilized  market-in the kind  of market  that much
of industry  enjoys.
B.  There is no reason to believe  that the supply control route outlined
here  would  result  in  any  important  loss  in  efficiency  to  society.
Farmers  would continue  to take  prices  as  given,  and each  farmer
would seek to produce  his quota  share  as  cheaply  as  possible  and
hence maximize his  individual profits. The incentive  to adopt new
cost  reducing  technologies  is  still  a part  of  the system.  If  at  the
parity  prices  established  by Congress,  farmers  generally  began  to
make  excessive  profits-higher  returns  on  their  investments  than
in other  parts of  the economy-this  would be used  as evidence  in
political debate to lower the level of parity prices to farmers.  Parity
prices  in this  context would  be  set  and reset in  the same  general
way  that tariffs and  rates  are set  for the more  conventional  pub-
lic  utilities,  namely,  through public  pressure,  political  debate,  and
group  action.  Assuming  a  constant  price  level,  we  could  expect
the benefits arising out of farm technological advances  to be passed
along to consumers  as the level of parity prices was lowered through
political  action.
VI.  Conclusion
The  supply control  approach  is  not designed  to cope with  all the
problems of agriculture. It cannot, for example, provide good incomes
to farmers on small, inadequate units. It cannot stop the trend to larger
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not provide  managerial  ability  where that  capacity  is  lacking.  But  it
can do one  thing, provided farmers generally are willing to accept con-
trols:  It can stabilize the  market. It  can  take  the  feast  and  famine
characteristic  out of  agriculture  and  guarantee  a  good  and  stable  in-
come to the aggregate  of farm operators.  It can  do this if farmers gen-
erally  value  good  and  stable  incomes  enough  to  accept  the  controls
over  supply that are  prerequisites  to such  incomes  in American  agri-
culture in the  1950's  and  1960's.
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